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RECENT DECISIONS
The right of dissenting stockholders to payment, created by the
Legislature, cannot upon any ground of assumed public policy be
limited by the courts to the dissenting stockholders of the absorbed
corporation. It follows that the appellant, as a dissenting stock-
holder of the merging corporation was entitled to the relief
demanded.
S. B. S.
BONDS - RETIREMENT BY LOT - NATURE OF CONTRACT-
BRFAcH.-Plaintiff is holder of fifteen-year gold bonds issued by
the defendant in 1925, providing for retirement by lot of bonds in
the sum of $5,000 every year from 1930 to 1939, at 105% of its
face value and accrued interest. Defendant failed to pay interest
or retire any bonds in 1930 and 1931. Defendant was voluntarily
dissolved and taken over by a successor in 1928. Plaintiff brings
action for value of his bonds on ground of breach of contract.
Defendant contends that plaintiff can have no cause of action on
the bonds until 1940. Appellate Division affirmed a judgment for
plaintiff on the grounds of anticipatory breach and impossibility
of performance. On appeal, held, the failure to retire the bonds con-
stituted a present breach of contract giving plaintiff an immediate
right of action. Hall v. Nassau Consumers Ice Company, 260 N. Y.
417, 183 N. E. 903 (1933).
A failure to perform some obligation or promise which is part
of the contract constitutes a breach thereof.' One of the rights
plaintiff paid for and which defendant obligated itself to perform
was the yearly retirement of bonds by lot.2 Upon defendant's fail-
ure to so perform a breach occurred and an immediate right of
action accrued to plaintiff therefore.3 Where the contract is for
the payment of money only at a future time, there can be no antici-
patory breach and no action can be maintained thereon until the
specified time has arrived,4 unless it contains an acceleration clause.
It is not anticipatory where the alleged breach of the contract does
not precede the time of performance or actual tender.5 The time
for defendant to perform its obligations had passed. In the instant
'WILuSTON, CONTRACTS (1924) §1288.
2 Weinman v. Blake & Knowles Steam Pump Works, 156 App. Div. 168,
140 N. Y. Supp. 1085 (4th Dept. 1913).
aSupra note 1.
'Kelly v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 78 N. E. 584
(1906); Werner v. Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154 N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dept.
1915) ; Bauchle v. Bauchle, 185 App. Div. 590, 173 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1st Dept.
1918).
'Wester v. Casein Co. of America, 206 N. Y. 506, 514, 100 N. E. 488, 490
(1912).
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case the defendant failed to retire bonds each year and the plaintiff
was thereby deprived of his equal chance and right to have his bonds
retired. 6 There was, therefore, not an anticipatory but an actual
breach of the contract for which plaintiff had a right to immediately
maintain his action and not wait until 1940. This was not an in-
stallment contract.7
J. P.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE-RIGHT TO ALIMONY TER-
MINATES UPON REMARRIAGE-RELIEF ON SEPARATION AGREEMENT.
-Plaintiff and defendant entered into a separation agreement pro-
viding primarily for the separate support and maintenance of the
plaintiff, wife. Subsequently alimony was awarded to the wife by
a judgment of divorce in her favor. Plaintiff remarried and the
defendant moved to strike from the judgment the provisions for
alimony. Held, The provisions for alimony should be stricken out,
without prejudice to plaintiff's right to seek relief under the sep-
aration agreement. Severance v. Severance, 260 N. Y. 432, 183
N. E. 909 (1933).
Where the plaintiff in a divorce action remarries after the
final judgment has been entered, the court upon proper application
of the defendant, must modify the judgment by striking out the
provisions for alimony.'
A separation agreement which provides for future support and
maintenance is in recognition of the husband's continuing liability
to support his wife.2  The consideration for the husband's agree-
ment to 'pay is his release from obligation, except as under the
separation agreement.3 Some cases hold that a valid separation
agreement is not abrogated by a subsequent judgment of divorce
Supra note 2.
SRoehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780 (1899) ; Foxell v. Fletcher,
87 N. Y. 476 (1882) ; Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 41, 25 N. E. 292 (1890) ;
Wharton & Co. v. Winch, 140 N. Y. 287, 35 N. E. 589 (1893); McCready v.
Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E. 208 (1902) ; Kelly v. Security Mutual Life
Ins. Co., supra note 4.
'N. Y. CrvL PRACTICE ACT §1159. The section is mandatory. Mowbray
v. Mowbray, 136 App. Div. 513, 121 N. Y. Supp. 45 (1st Dept. 1910); Sever-
ance v. Severance, 235 App. Div. 799, 255 N. Y. Supp. 998 (2d Dept. 1932);
Linton v. Hall, 86 Misc. 560, 149 N. Y. Supp. 385 (1914); Dumproff v.
Dumproff, 138 Misc. 298, 244 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1930).
2Galusha v. Galusha, 116 N. Y. 635, 643, 22 N. E. 1114, 1116 (1889);
Winter v. Winter, 191 N. Y. 462, 473, 474, 84 N. E. 382, 386 (1908) ; Lawson v.
Lawson, 56 App. Div. 535, 537, 67 N. Y. Supp. 356, 357 (2d Dept. 1900) ; Effray
v. Effray, 110 App. Div. 545, 547, 97 N. Y. Supp. 286, 287 (1st Dept. 1905);
Dower v. Dower, 36 Misc. 559, 561, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1080, 1081 (1901).
3 Pettit v. Pettit, 107 N. Y. 677, 679, 14 N. E. 500, 502 (1887).
